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At one time, it was well established that a corporation could
not be convicted of a crime.' One of the primary reasons for
precluding liability was the theoretical difficulty of attributing
mens rea to a fictional entity 2 However, under present law, cor-
porations can be held liable for most crimes, 3 including those re-
quiring a specific intent. 4
In the criminal conspiracy area, 5 corporate liability is com-
plicated by the requirement that two or more persons must be in-
' Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701) (Holt, C.J.); 2 W BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTAnjES 476, 476-77 (1803). For a discussion of the reasons why corporations were
historically held innmune from criminal liability, see Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Respon-
sibility, YALE L.J. 827, 828-31 (1927).
2 See Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 153 S.W 459, 460-61 (Ky. 1913);
Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd v. Ward, [1902] K.B. 91 (1901). See generally Mueller, Mens
Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PiTT. L. Rkv. 21, 38 (1957) (noting the "difficulty of
reconciling the imposition of psycho-ethical legal guilt, blameworthiness, upon a brainless,
soulless entity with the mandate of our law that all criminal liability must rest on per-
sonal conscious wrongdoing").
3 In New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909), the
Supreme Court stated that "there are some crimes which in their nature cannot be com-
mitted by corporations." However, since that time, as Mueller states, "the law has rapid-
ly moved to the stand that a corporation can be guilty of most, if not all, crimes." Mueller,
supra note 2, at 22. See, e.g., State v. Lehigh Valley R., 103 A. 685 (N.J. 1917) (corpora-
tion can be held guilty of manslaughter). For an in-depth discussion of corporate crime,
see generally Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977).
4 See Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1969) (cor-
poration can be convicted of a crime involving knowledge and willfulness); United States
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F 823, 835 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1906) ("[T]hese defen-
dant corporations claim that since in conspiracy evil intent is of the essence of the crime,
inherent impossibility renders the accusation futile. I think this is but the remnant of a
theory always fanciful and in process of abandonment"). See also the authorities cited
in Edgerton, supra note 1, at 828 n.11; Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle
Extended to Its Limits, 38 FED. B.J. 49, 52 (1979) ("The clear weight of authority has
upheld corporate liability for specific intent crimes").
5 A general discussion of the crime of conspiracy is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See generally Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Prac-
tice, 65 CEO. L.J. 925 (1977); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HAsv. L. REV. 393 (1922);
Developments in the Law-Crimmal Conspiracy, 72 HAnv. L. REV. 920 (1958-59).
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volved in the criminal activity 6 When the offense has been com-
mitted solely by the agents7 of a single corporation-
intracorporate conspiracy-the courts have had difficulty in deter-
mimng whether the requisite number of actors is satisfied. If the
corporation and its agents are considered as a single entity, then
a conspiracy cannot be shown.8 To avoid this interpretation, the
Eleventh Circuit recently held in United States v. Hartley9 that
it is possible for a corporation to conspire with its own
employees. 10 In reaching this decision, the court analyzed the in-
tracorporate conspiracy question improperly
This Comment will focus on why it is incorrect to view the
corporate entity as a conspirator. Initially, the standards govern-
ing corporate criminal liability will be discussed. The limited case
law directly dealing with intracorporate conspiracy under the
federal criminal conspiracy statute" will then be examined. In
conclusion, a two-stage method for analyzing the issue of corporate
criminal liability for acts of its agents that violate the federal con-
spiracy law12 will be proposed.
6 See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934); Nelson Radio & Supply Co.
v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
7 The term "agent" is defined in the Model Penal Code as "any director, officer, ser-
vant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or associa-
tion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This Comment
uses the term "agent" in accordance with the Model Penal Code definition.
8 Under antitrust law, the corporation and its agents are generally treated as com-
posing a single legal entity so that the corporation is not subject to liability for the acts
of its agents. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d at 914. See note 68 infra
for other antitrust cases.
9 678 F.2d 961 (i1th Cir. 1982).
10 Id. at 972.
" The general federal conspiracy statute is 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). It provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be lined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Title 18 also includes 26 other conspiracy statutes.
12 This Comment is limited to a study of mtracorporate conspiracy under the federal
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I. THE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR STANDARD
Respondeat superior is the standard for imposing corporate
criminal liability under federal common law 13 Under tis doc-
trine, the acts and intent of the agents of the corporation will be
imputed to the corporation if the agent was acting on behalf of
the corporation within the scope of his employment.14
A. Development of the Respondeat Superior Standard
The leading case first establishing respondeat superior as the
basis of corporate criminal liablity is New York Central & Hud-
son River Railroad v. United States.'5 The issue before the
United States Supreme Court was the constitutionality of the Elkins
Act, 16 which provided that acts committed by the agents of a
corporate common carrier that violated the Interstate Commerce
Act would be imputed to the corporation. The corporation argued
that the law was unconstitutional because Congress lacked the
power to impute criminal offenses to the corporation, or to sub-
ject a corporation to criminal prosecution. 7
In rejecting the corporation's contentions, the Court first noted
that it was well settled law that a corporation would be held
responsible for the acts of its agents in tort actions, stating: "In
such cases the liability is not imputed because the principal ac-
tually participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is
done for the benefit of the principal, while the agent is acting
13 See New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909);
United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HAnv. L. REv. 1227, 1247 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as
Developments-Corporate Crime].
14 New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. at 494-95; Devel-
opments-Corporate Crime, supra note 13, at 1247.
15 212 U.S. at 481.
16 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. 95-473 § 4(b), (c), 92 Stat. 1466,
1466-70 (1978).
17 212 U.S. at 492. The corporation also argued that the statute operated to deprive
the innocent stockholders of their property without due process of law. In response to this
contention, the Court stated that there was "no valid objection in law, and every reason
in public policy, why the corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act
through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable. " Id. at 495.
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within the scope of his employment. "18 The Court asserted
that in applying the civil liability standards, it was only going "a
step farther" to hold that the acts of an agent can be imputed to
the corporation and criminal penalties imposed on the corpo-
ration.19
B. Application of Respondeat Superior
New York Central Railroad and subsequent cases demonstrate
that corporate criminal liability is founded on agency principles
derived from tort law 20 Under respondeat superior, the acts and
intent of the corporate agents are imputed to the corporation.2'
Consequently, corporate liability is necessarily vicanous 22 In ad-
dition, the agents who committed the offense remain personally
liable.23 However, federal courts do not require consistency in
verdicts, and the corporation can be convicted even though the
individual defendants are acquitted.24
18 Id. at 493.
19 Id. at 494.
20 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (cor-
porate liability is "a part of the law of respondeat superior and accepted as [an] establish-
ed [principle] in civil tort situations"); United States v. George F Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d
798, 801 (2d Cir.) ("the Supreme Court has long ago determined that the corporation may
be held criminally liable for the acts of an agent within the scope of his employment"),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir.)
(noting that respondeat superior is the test of corporate liability for the acts of its agents
"whether such acts be criminal or tortious"), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943). See also
Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 13, at 1247 (respondeat superior is based
on "agency principles of tort law"). For a discussion of the respondeat superior tort pnn-
ciples, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) comment a (1958); W PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAv OF TORTs § 70, at 460-67 (4th ed. 1971).
21 See Miller, supra note 4, at 52 ("The criminal liability of corporations is
theoretically based on imputing the acts and intent of corporate employees and agents
to the entity itself").
22 W LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 33, at 231 (1972) ("It must be emphasiz-
ed again that corporate criminal liability is a form of vicarious liability"); see also Fisse,
The Distinction Between Primary and Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liability, 41
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 203, 205 (1967).
23 See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 407-09 (1962) (individual corporate of-
ficer held liable for acts of conspiracy). See generally Note, Individual Liability of Agents
for Corporate Crimes Under the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 31 VAND. L. REv. 965,
977-79 (1978).
24 See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(associations were convicted but jury acquitted all individual defendants), af'd, 317 U.S.
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The first element of respondeat superior requires that the agent
must have been acting within the scope of his employment.ai The
criminal act must be directly related to duties which the agent
has authority to perform2 and must be done with the "intention
to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of
which he is employed. ' ' The scope of employment principle has
been interpreted broadly by the courts. That the agent's criminal
activity was specifically forbidden by his superiors is not a defense
to the corporation.2 Nor is it a defense that the corporate of-
ficials acted in good faith to prevent the violations29 or that the
acts were claimed to be ultra vzres3o or "beyond the power of the
corporation as defined by its charter or act of incorporation. '" 31
The second element necessary for application of respondeat
superior is that the agent must be acting on behalf of the
corporation,3 or with the intent to benefit the corporation.I The
519 (1943); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.) ("[A]lthough
a corporation acts only through its agents, their indictment is not a condition precedent
to prosecution against the corporation"), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); United States
v. Austin Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929) (conviction of numerous defen-
dants of conspiracy is not reversible because of the inexplicable acquittal of other
defendants).
2 See United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
915 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d at 127; C.I.T. Corp. v. United
States, 150 F.2d 85, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1945).
2 Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960).
27 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d at 128.
28 See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., 464 F.2d 1295, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948).
29 See St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393, 398-99 (lst Cir.
1955) (Magruder, J., concurring); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d at 90. Some
commentators have argued that "due diligence" on the part of the corporation should be
a defense. See generally Miller, supra note 4, at 66-68 (refusal of courts to accept a due
diligence defense "undermines the goal of deterring future criminal conduct by corpora-
tions"); Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 13, at 1257-58 (proposal for a new
system of corporate liability where the corporation could rebut the presumption of liability
under respondeat superior by proving that it "exercised due diligence to prevent the crime").
30 E.g., Louisville By. v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W 343, 344 (Ky. 1908). See 10
W FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIAOFTHE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4959 (pern. ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
31 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 22, § 33, at 234.
32 See United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1168 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1966).
33 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d at 127 (quoting New York Cent.
& H.R. R.R., 212 U.S. at 493); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d at 379.
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criminal acts do not actually have to benefit the corporation;14 it
is the expectation of benefit that controls.5 However, the agent's
acts are not considered to be undertaken to benefit the corpora-
tion if they are performed "solely to advance the agent's own in-
terests or interests of parties other than the corporate
employer. "36
The status of the agent in the corporate hierarchy is irrele-
vant to the determination of corporate liability37 As .the Fifth
Circuit stated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,35 "the cor-
poration may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even
menial employees." 39
34 See United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d at 942; United States v. Empire Packing
Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.) (quoting Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d
905, 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945)), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
35 307 F.2d at 128. The Court stated that it is the "expectation or hope of a benefit,
whether direct or indirect [that] makes the act that of the principal. The act is no less
the principal's if from such intended conduct either no benefit accrues, a benefit is in-
discernable, or, for that matter, the result turns out to be adverse." Id.
36 LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 22, § 33, at 234. The Fifth Circuit in Standard Oil
Co. v. Texas held that a corporation was not subject to crininal liability when the acts
of its agents were performed for the benefit of a third party and actually resulted in a
theft of the corporation's property. 307 F.2d at 129.
37 See United States v. George F Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d at 801 ("No distinctions are
made in these cases between officers and agents, or between persons holding positions in-
volving varying degrees of responsibility"). See also Comment, Is Corporate Criminal
Liability Really NecessaryP 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 910 n.15 [hereinafter cited as Comment]
(observing that "virtually all modern cases" are in accord with the Fish statement of the
rule).
r 8 307 F.2d at 120.
39 Id. at 127. Although this principle is the accepted rule in federal courts, the status
of the agent necessary to unpute criminal liability to the corporation is a matter of con-
siderable commentary. Under the Model Penal Code, only the acts of high ranking of-
ficials within the corporation will be imputed to the corporation. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commission of the offense must be
"authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment." Id.
Mueller states that extending corporate liability to acts of menial employees "sub-
jects the corporation to acts which 'it' (as represented by the inner circle) has not willed,
not directed, not authorized. [H]ere the hand has moved without order from the
brain." Mueller, supra note 2, at 41.
The counter argument is that under the Model Penal Code approach high level of-
ficials will simply delegate authority and make it clear that they want to remain ignorant
as to any criminal acts, so that liability will easily be evaded. Developments-Corporate
Crime, supra note 13, at 1254.
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II. THE INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY PROBLEM
The question in intracorporate conspiracy cases is whether the
multiple entities necessary for a conspiracy exist when the corpora-
tion is charged with a crime committed solely by its own agents.
This issue has not been addressed in most mtracorporate criminal
conspiracy cases. When the problem has not been raised, courts
have consistently applied the respondeat superior principles and
imputed liability to the corporation. 40 However, when con-
fronted with this question, courts have had "conceptual dif-
ficulty"41 in determining the proper basis for corporate liability
A fundamental requirement of the criminal law of conspiracy
is thattwo or more persons must be engaged in a criminal enter-
prise in order to have a conspiracy 42 The term "person" in the
federal conspiracy statutes43 includes corporations. 44 Thus, some
courts have stated the intracorporate conspiracy issue in terms of
whether the corporation can be "counted" to satisfy the multiplicity
of actors requirement,4 or whether the corporation can conspire
with its agents.4 The case law has solved this problem by view-
ing the corporation as an actual participant in the conspiracy
40 E.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (ist Cir. 1982); Egan v.
United States, 137 F.2d at 379; Mimnsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir.
1939).
41 Hartley v. United States, 678 F.2d 961, 970-71 (l1th Cir. 1982); Dussouy v. Gulf
Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981).
42 See note 6 supra for cases illustrating the requirement of multiple actors.
43 See note 11 supra for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the criminal conspiracy statute.
44 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) states: "In determimng the meamng of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise the words 'person' and 'whoever' include cor-
porations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companes,
as well as individuals." See also United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F Supp.
577, 580-81 (S.D. Ohio 1976) ("Moreover, it is clear that the term 'person' within the mean-
ing of 18 U.S.C. § 371 also includes corporations").
4 See State v. Parker, 158 A. 797, 801 (Conn. 1932) ("[A] corporation may be a par-
ty to a conspiracy, counted in computing the number necessary to constitute it, and in-
dicted and convicted therefore").4 8 See United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F Supp. at 579-81; United States
v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129 slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. July 6, 1976) ("In light of
the fact that a corporation can only act through its agents, the effect of a charge of con-
spiracy as between Allied Chemical and its agents is, insofar as Allied is involved, a charge
of conspiracy with itself") (Allied Chem. Corp. has been reported at 420 F Supp. 122
(E.D. Va. 1976), but the preceding quote is not in the published opimon).
1983-84]
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A. United States v Consolidated Coal: An Issue of First
Impresson
The first case directly dealing with the ntracorporate crimnal
conspiracy problem was United States v. Consolidated Coal
Co. 47 In that case, the corporation and eight of its agents were
charged with conspiring to defraud the government. 48 The court
phrased the issue in these terms: "Can a corporation be charged
and convicted of conspiring solely with its own employees?" 49
The court distinguished another criminal conspiracy case,50
United States v. Carroll,5' which held that no conspiracy had
been established between the corporation and an individual of-
ficer who had so dominated the corporation that there was "no
organization and no one other than the sole criminal to deter or
punish." 52 The court also recognized that it would be map-
propriate to rely on cases concerning conspiracy under other
substantive areas of the law -3
Although the court in Consolidated Coal found no direct prece-
dent for the question before it, the court believed that a number
of cases had implicitly acknowledged that "a corporation can be
prosecuted for conspiring with its corporate personnel." 54 After
47 424 F Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The court stated: "In researching this issue
the court did not find any case which analyzed the precise question presented herein."
Id. at 580.
48 The defendants were charged in a 172-count indictment. Id. at 578. The defen-
dants motion to dismiss the counts against them was denied by the court in its entirety.
Id. at 588. This discussion of the case is limited to the intracorporate conspiracy issue.
49 Id. at 579.
50 Id. at 579-80.
51 144 F Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y 1956).
52 Id. at 941.
53 424 F Supp. at 579. The defendants in Consolidated Coal argued that a corpora-
tion could not be convicted of conspiring with its own employees, citing antitrust cases
and cases alleging conspiracy to breach a contract. Id. The court disagreed, distinguishing
the antitrust cases as based on a restraint of trade rationale, and relied on United States
v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 417 (1962), for the proposition that freedom from contract liabili-
ty should not shield corporate officers from criminal prosecution. 424 F Supp. at 579.
54 424 F Supp. at 581. The court relied upon the following: United States v. Wise,
370 U.S. at 415-16 (corporate officer could be prosecuted for conspiracy under § 1 of the
Sherman Act); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949) (convictions of
a corporation and four of its agents for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 affirm-
ed with no discussion of intracorporate conspiracy issue); United States v. Sherpix, 512
F.2d 1361, 1367 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (allegations in the indictment insufficient to charge
[Vol. 72
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noting that a corporation is included in the statutory definition
of "person" and can act only through its agents,s the court
concluded:
[E]mployment alone by a corporation does not so merge the
employee's mind and being with that of the corporation so that
one person's cognition remains rather than more than one. When
separate individual judgments and decisions are capable of be-
mg made by both a corporation and one or more of its employees,
there is a vast dissimilarity to the facts of Carroll in which one
man used the corporate form to commit a criminal act. The
Court concludes then that a corporation can be charged with
conspiring with its corporate personnel.ss
The court's analysis is troubling. The implication of the court's
language is that if only one individual was involved, but that per-
son did not dominate the corporation as in Carroll, then a con-
spiracy could be established. The better approach is that the two
or more persons necessary for a conspiracy should be determined
by reference to the number of natural persons engaged in the
criminal activity, without considering the corporation as an
actor.57 Since there were eight individuals charged with the con-
corporation with conspiracy); Alamo Fence Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.
1957) (question of intracorporate conspiracy not presented on appeal and conviction of
the corporation and its agents for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 affirmed); United
States v. Bridell, 180 F Supp. 268, 279 (N.D. IMl. 1960) (evidence insufficient against cor-
poration and two officers to establish conspiracy to evade income taxes); United States
v. Kemmel, 160 F Supp. 718, 720-21 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (conspiracy properly charged against
corporation and two agents for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371). For an excellent discussion
of these cases, see Welling, Intracorporate Plurality In Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33
HAsTINcs L.J. 1155, 1184-94 (1982) (noting that only one case has held that multiple
agents of a single corporation cannot constitute a plurality: United States v. Allied Chem.
Corp., No. 76-0129).
In several other cases, the intracorporate conspiracy issue was not presented on ap-
peal and the convictions of the corporate defendants were affirmed with no analysis of
the question. See United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir. 1982); Egan v.
United States, 137 F.2d at 369; Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939).
' 5 424 F Supp. at 581. See note 44 supra for the text of 1 U.S.C. § 1 which includes
corporations within the definition of the word "person."
5 424 F Supp. at 581.
57 For an excellent discussion of conspiracy between a single agent and the corpora-
tion under criminal conspiracy law, see Welling, supra note 54, at 1185-91. Welling states
that "cases addressing this question support the point of view that criminal conspiratorial
liability cannot be established by a single agent of a corporation." Id. at 1191.
1983-84]
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spiracy in Consolidated Coal, the multiplicity of actors was
satisfied without regard to the corporation. This is the crucial fact
that should distinguish the case from Carroll, not the amount of
control the employees exerted over the corporation.
After the court in Consolidated Coal observed that a corpora-
tion is statutorily encompassed within the word "person," it pro-
ceeded on the assumption that a corporation is capable of think-
ing and acting.i0 However, the fact that a corporation is subject
to criminal liability as if it were a person does not invest a lifeless
entity with human attributes. As the Supreme Court cautioned
in New York Central, the appropriate basis for determining liabili-
ty is respondeat superior. Under this concept, whether "the prin-
cipal actually participated in the malice or fraud"60 is irrelevant.
For this reason, the court erred in holding that a corporation can
conspire with its agents.
B. United States v Hartley: A Reaffirmation of Consolidated
Coal
In United States v. Hartley,60 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of a corporation and two of its
officers for conspiracy to defraud the United States gov-
ernment. 61 The court viewed the issue in terms of [w]hether a
corporation can conspire with its officers, agents, and em-
ployees. "62 The court began its analysis with these state-
ments:
The difficulty in accepting the theory of intracorporate con-
spiracy is conceptual. Under elementary agency principles, a cor-
poration is personified through the acts of its agents.-Thus, the
acts of its agents become the acts of the corporation as a single
entity The conceptual difficulty is easily overcome, however,
58 424 F Supp. at 580-81.
59 212 U.S. at 493. See the text accompanying notes 16-19 supra for a discussion of
respondeat superior and criminal liability.
60 678 F.2d at 961.
61 Id. at 992. At trial, the jury convicted the defendants on all thirty-three counts
of the indictment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Id. This discussion of
the case is limited to the court's analysis of the intracorporate conspiracy issue.
62 Id. at 968.
[Vol. 72
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by acknowledging the underlying purpose for the creation of this
fiction-to expand corporate responsibility We decline to
expand the fiction only to limit corporate responsibility in the
context of the criminal conspiracy now before us.63
These remarks are confusing because the court established no
basis for corporate liability The court referred to the corpora-
hon and its agents as composing a single entity, but seemingly
disregarded the liability problem because of the desirability of cor-
porate responsibility The court quoted a statement made by Justice
Harlan in United States-v. Wise:1 "[T]he fiction of corporate en-
tity, operative to protect officers from contract liability, had never
been applied as a shield against criminal prosecutions. "6
Considering this language "most persuasive," the court conclud-
ed that corporations should not be allowed to escape liability by
"the fiction of corporate personification. " With no analysis of
how the conspiracy was established, the court found its "concep-
tual difficulty" was "easily overcome" by policy concerns. 7
The court devoted most of its analysis to a discussion of the
results reached in cases dealing with intracorporate conspiracy
under antitrust law 6 The court relied heavily upon Dussouy v.
Gulf Coast Investment Corp., a conspiracy in restraint of trade
case where the Fifth Circuit held that "in certain circumstances
a corporation can conspire with its employees."70
The Hartley court noted that the general rule developed under
federal antitrust cases is that the corporation is not subject to liabili-
ty when only its own agents are involved in a conspiracy 71
63 Id. at 970 (emphasis in original).
64 370 U.S. at 405.
6 Id. at 417 (Harlan, J., concurring).
66 678 F.2d at 972.
67 Id. at 970.
68 Id. at 969-71. Many courts have relied on precedent from the antitrust law. See
United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129, slip .p at 2; United States v. Kern-
mel, 160 F Supp. at 721; United States v. Carroll, 144 F Supp. at 942.
0 660 F.2d at 594. The court cited to Dussouy four times and quoted several
passages from that opimon. 678 F.2d at 970-72.
70 660 F.2d at 602.
71 678 F.2d at 970. The leading case precluding corporate liability for intracorporate
conspiracy under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), is Nelson Radio & Supply Co.
v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denwd, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
This case has been consistently followed by the other circuits in antitrust actions. See H
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72
Although the court distinguished these cases as based on the
restraint of trade concept, 72 it adopted an exception to the rule
under antitrust law 7 According to this exception, the corpora-
ton will be held liable "when the officer has an independent stake
in achieving the corporation's illegal objective." 74 The court add-
ed: "We now adopt this exception and.hold that it is possible for
a corporation to conspire with its own officers, agents and
employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371."75
The court's reasoning is contradictory After purporting to
distinguish the antitrust cases, the court adopted an exception for-
mulated under antitrust law This exception (that the agent has
to be acting for his own benefit) is in direct conflict with the
respondeat superior principle that the agent must act to benefit
the corporation. 76 Since respondeat superior is the accepted stan-
& B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester, 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978); Morton
Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1976); Greenville
Publishing Co. v The Dairy Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d'391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974); Marion
County Coop. Ass n v. Carnation Co., 114 F Supp. 58, 62 (W.D. Ark. 1953), aff'd, 214
F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1954). But see White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129
F.2d 600, 605 "8th Cir. 1942); Patterson v. United States, 222 F.599, 619, 632-33 (6th
Cir.), cert. ddnid, 238 U.S. 635 (1915). For a discussion of plurality under the antitrust
laws, see generally Stengel, Intra-Enterprtse Conspiracy Under § 1 of the Sherman Act,
35 MIss. L.J. 5 (1963); Note, Intra-Enterprtse Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63
YALE L.J. 372 (1954).
Corporate liability for intracorporate conspiracy is also an issue in the civil rights
cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981). The cases are conflicting. Compare Novot-
ny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257-59 (3d Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(coordinated actions by corporate officers and directors could satisfy the conspiracy re-
quirerrenis of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S.
366 (1979) with Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (conspiracy not
established when only agents of the corporation are involved). See generally Note, In-
tracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c): The Impact of Novotny v. Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 13 GA. L. REV. 591 (1979); Note, Intracorporate
Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 HAnV. L. REV. 470 (1978).
72 678 F.2d at 970-71.
73 Id. at 972. See also Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d
256, 289 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Greenville Publishing Co.
v. The Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d at 399; Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424, 427 (3d
Cir. 1971); Jewel Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida, Inc., 497 F Supp. 513, 518
(M.D. Fla. 1980). See generally 10 FLETCHER, supra note 30, at § 4884; 10A FLETCHER,
supra note 14, at § 5032.1.
74 678 F.2d at 971.
75 Id. at 972.
76 See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this reqiiirement.
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dard in the federal courts for corporate criminal liability,77 it is
unwise to adopt a theory that is inconsistent with that doctrine.
Antitrust rules and exceptions to those rules have no applica-
tion in the criminal conspiracy area. The antitrust principles were
developed to deal with unique policies of the law under the Sher-
man Act.78 As one commentator notes, intracorporate conspiracy
"does not raise any of the anticompetitive concerns that the an-
titrust laws were designed to eliminate." 79 Courts should avoid
reliance on inapplicable precedent from other substantive areas
of law Focusing on these principles only confuses the issue.
Hartley -eaffirmed the position first taken by Consolidated
Coal that a corporation can conspire with its agents.80 The courts
have engAged in this fiction of the corporation as an actual par-
ticipant in the conspiracy to achieve the desired result of corporate
liability Sowever, in cases where two or more individual agents
are involvdd in the crime, resort to this fiction is unnecessary
because the'multiplicity of actors could be demonstrated without
regard to the corporation.
Thus, although the analysis in Hartley is unsound in several
respects, the court reaches the correct result in ultimately holding
the corporation liable for the acts of its agents.8' As recognized
by the courts in both Dussouy and Hartley, "the action by an in-
corporated collection of individuals creates the 'group danger' at
which conspiracy liability is aimed, and the view of the corpora-
tion as a single legal actor bcomes a fiction without a purpose." 2
77 See notes 13-39 supra and accompanying text for a formulation of this standard.
78 15 U.S.C. § 1 deals with conspiracies "in restraint of trade" and 15 U.S.C. § 2
prohibits monopolies.
79 Welling, supra note 54, at 1164-65.
80 See notes 47-58 supra and accompanying text for a discusmon of the court's holding
in Consolidated Coal.
81 The literature is replete with discussions of the justifications and criticisms of un-
posing criminal liability on the corporation in general. For a persuasive defense of cor-
porate criminal liability, see Edgerton, supra note. 1, at 832-44. Several commentators
have argued that the deterrence goal of the criminal law would be better served by im-
posing liability on the guilty actor. See Mueller, supra note 2, at 45; Note, Criminal Libility
of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60 HAnv. L. REv. 283, 286 (1946); Comment,
supra note 37, at 927. For a concise summary of the arguments on both siaes, see LAFAVE
& SCOTT, supra note 22, § 33, at 231-32.
82 Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d at 603, quoted in Hartley v. United




Courts should use a two-stage method of analysis to resolve
the problem of intracorporate conspiracy The question of whether
the two or more persons necessary to establish a conspiracy has
been shown is a distinct inquiry from the issue of corporate
responsibility 83 At the first stage of analysis, whether the actors
are corporate employees is irrelevant. The only consideration
should be whether the requisite number of natural persons par-
ticipated in the crime. If this multiplicity of actors exists, then
a conspiracy is substantiated. Once the conspiracy is demonstrated,
the question at the second stage of analysis is whether the cor-
poration may be held responsible for the acts of its agents. If the
agents were acting within the scope of their employment with the
intent to benefit the corporation, then the acts and intent of the
agents should be imputed to the corporation under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. At this stage, corporate liability may thus
be established without reference to the number of persons involved
in the criminal act.
This method of analysis simply applies the basic concepts of
the criminal law of conspiracy and the agency doctrine of
respondeat superior. The approach suggested thus avoids the "con-
ceptual difficulty"84 courts have had in determimng the proper
basis for corporate criminal liability
Susan J Hoffmann
83 Other commentators have also suggested that the analysis of intracorporate con-
spiracy should be in two distinct stages. See Barndt, Two Trees or OneP-The Problem
of Intra-Enterprtse Consptracy, 23 MONT. L. REv. 158, 184 (1962) (the analysis under
the antitrust law should be "whether a conspiracy can exist between the officers of a cor-
poration acting among themselves in its behalf; and if so, whether the corporation can
be held liable"); Welling, supra note 54, at 1195 ("Properly posed, the question is in two
parts: whether multiple agents of a single corporation constitute a plurality; and, if so,
whether the standards of corporate criminal liability are met so that the corporation is
vicariously liable for the conspiracies of its agents"); Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), supra note 71 at 487.
84 678 F.2d at 970; 660 F.2d at 603.
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